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Regional Development, Nature Production and the Techno-bureaucratic Shortcut: 
The Douro River Catchment in Portugal 
 
Antonio A. R. Ioris 
 
“Quien compra diabos, nun puôde bender santos” 
[That who buys devils cannot sell saints] 
Mirandese adage, from Miranda do Douro 
 
 
Abstract: The introduction of the Water Framework Directive in Europe represents a 
unique opportunity to promote more inclusive strategies for the long-term preservation of 
(socionatural) water systems. However, the analysis of the Portuguese experience, using 
the River Douro as a case study, reveals still considerable shortcomings in the assessment 
of problems and the formulation of solutions. Instead of promoting a meaningful dialogue 
between social groups and spatial areas, there is a systematic attempt to conform to legal 
requisites by taking a ‘techno-bureaucratic’ shortcut that largely reproduces the 
distortions of previous regulatory approaches. Decisions on water management are part of 
political disputes about regional development and state reform, such as in relation to the 
provision of water and electricity by public utilities. Nonetheless, those broader issues 
have been kept tacitly away from the WFD agenda, which so has been concentrated on 
adjusting established procedures to the (formal) requirements of the new regulation.  
 
Keywords: River Douro, River Duero, WFD, institutional reforms, water charges, 
political ecology. 
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1. Introduction    
 
It has been widely observed, both in the academic and non-academic media, that 
water management is becoming an issue of increasing concern nowadays. The ecological 
restoration of aquatic systems and the availability of clean, safe drinking water are 
certainly attracting growing attention from policy-makers, industries, environmental 
activists and society at large. In that context, this paper seeks to discuss the introduction 
of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) in Portugal, using the River Douro, a very 
strategic river basin located in the northern part of the Iberian Peninsula, as a case study. 
WFD has been locally praised by public and private organisations mainly because of its 
focus away from isolated problems and in favour of catchment approaches and a more 
efficient use of water. The analysis will outline specific historico-geographical 
circumstances and their influence on the formulation and implementation of public 
policies on water use and conservation. Water management reforms will be seen as part 
of the contested relationship between nature and society and in the perspective of 
regional development, given that the new procedural mode of water governance under 
WFD depends on a series of “contextual and contingent” factors operating at the regional 
scale (cf. Kastens and Newig, 2007). The ongoing experience in the Douro will be 
reviewed in relation to the broader theories on water management that have underpinned 
the reform of regulatory institutions in Europe and beyond. The main contribution of the 
paper is a reflection on the (still) narrow scope of water management institutions, insofar 
as they have been largely restricted to economic and technocratic aspects of water 
management, but failed to advance solid basis for democratic decision making and long-
term resolution of problems.  
It is important to mention that the Douro was carefully chosen for this research 
because of its unique history and relevant geographical position. The renewed pressures 
over water stocks (it is projected an increase in water demand by 23% between 2000 and 
2020, cf. INAG, 2001), particularly in the form of new dams, additional electric 
generation and urban water supply, emerge in tandem with growing concerns about 
environmental disruption and the urgent need to restore freshwater ecology. During the 
research, water was regularly on the headlines of the mass media and was constantly 
 3 
mentioned by an ample spectrum of political parties and social groups.1 It was highly 
emblematic to watch the Environment Minister coming to the television to announce the 
construction, until 2020, of ten large hydropower schemes (including six in the Douro) 
and the expansion of the existing ones (many of those in the Douro).2 The same minister 
had recently announced a tender for the selection of private companies to operate, in the 
form of concession, water supply systems.3 It was also significant to notice some large 
energy and construction companies, normally associated with extensive environmental 
impacts, invoking the Kyoto protocol and the creation of new jobs as an outstanding 
justification for new hydropower schemes.4 It was not by chance, thus, that our study 
coincided with several developments that were fraught with symbolism about the past 
and the future of water use in the catchment and in the country at large.5 To be sure, the 
debate about the management of the River Douro is still in its infancy and is restricted to 
a small number of stakeholders that gravitate around public agencies and is largely 
focused on the implementation of WFD. The new Directive is considered the decisive 
answer to challenging water management problems, given that its regulatory objectives 
are not chemical or hydrological, as in previous legislations, but are now essentially 
ecological (Pimenta Machado, CCDR-N officer, pers. commun.).  
The new WFD regulation betrays the influence of concepts like ‘integrated water 
resource management’ (IWRM), described by Mitchell (2005) as a holistic approach that 
                                                 
1 For example, “EDP will explore the Foz Tua dam” [EDP vai explorar barragem de Foz Tua], 
Semanário Económico, 04 Apr 2008. 
2 New dams are included in National Programme of Dams with High Hydroelectric Potential 
(PNBEPH), published in 2007. 
3 Cf. “Water privatisation will move forward“ [Privatização da água vai avançar], Expresso, 05 
Nov 2007. 
4 Cf. “New dams create seven thousand new jobs and involve two billion euros of investment” 
[Novas barragens criam sete mil novos empregos e envolvem dois mil milhões de investimento], 
Público, 25 Mar 2008.  
5 The fieldwork research in the Douro took place in March-April of 2008. The main source of 
information was through semi-structured, in-depth interviews about water use and the 
implementation of the new water legislation. Respondents included 22 key stakeholders (i.e. 4 
regulators/policy-makers, 5 NGO members, 3 consultants/academics and 10 water users 
[hydropower, public water supply, industry, agriculture and navigation]), who were firstly 
identified from publications and official documents. Additional names were identified according 
to a snowball referral strategy. The interviews were followed-up by e-mail and telephone 
discussions. The observation also involved travelling along the catchment by boat and train, and 
the attendance of public meetings about regional development. Historical information and 
secondary hydrological data were systematised and analysed.  
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is both comprehensive and integrated. However, in different countries the policies based 
on the IWRM rationale have demonstrated a recurrent difficulty to understand the 
dynamic, contingent and contestable nature of water use and conservation. Blomquist and 
Schlager (2005) argue that “[t]he politics of boundary drawing, decision making, and 
accountability offer important reasons to be sceptical of the prospects for integrated 
watershed management, at least as some proponents envision it”. Our research in the 
Douro noticed the influence of this international doctrine of water management, but still 
without enough critical assessments of its shortcomings and repercussions. Crucially it 
was possible to detect the paradox between the application of science and economics to 
water management and the difficulty to achieve ecological stability and political equity. 
This contradiction is persistently hidden behind repeated claims about the soundness of 
environmental regulation advanced by the new Directive. Even the few voices that 
question the causes of water management problems still concentrate their criticism on 
isolated projects, like new dams or utility privatisation, and rarely offer a comprehensive 
critique of the ideological continuity between old and new paradigms of water regulation. 
After the critical assessment of the regulatory procedures being developed for the 
Douro catchment, it will be ultimately argued that, instead of establishing a genuine new 
approach to deal with water management problems, the ‘new’ institutions seem to 
replicate the old patterns of water development and the uneven decision-making 
established in the early 20th Century.6 In order to reveal the gap between changes in 
discourse and achievements on the ground the text is organised as follows: the next 
section discusses the political gap in the ongoing water institutional reforms. The essay 
than provides a brief overview of the evolution of water use and water problems in the 
Douro. That is followed by a critical scrutiny of the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive in the catchment. The text ends with some overall conclusions 
about the missed opportunities to transform the basis of water use and conservation.  
 
2. The politics of water institutional reforms  
 
                                                 
6 Institutions are systems of prevalent social rules that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 
2006) and are also complex phenomena, whose reproduction is incomplete, provisional and 
unstable and that coevolved with a range of other complex emergent phenomena (Jessop, 2001). 
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Water management is an important item of the contemporary environmental 
debate, a question that has attracted growing public interest in recent years.7 It is not 
difficult to notice that the ‘environment’ has been more and more popularised, has left its 
previous clandestine position to become incorporated into everyday discussions. 
Nonetheless, while there has been an increasing appropriation of the environmental 
agenda, not just by governments and civic organisations, but also by private companies 
and large corporations, the political nature of water management is still rarely 
acknowledged. Water degradation has become the object of uncountable technical reports 
and extensive media coverage, but little has been said about the political responsibilities 
for past interventions and the asymmetric opportunities to decide on the management of 
water systems. For instance, Swyngedouw (1999) already demonstrated that, although the 
significance of water management has attracted considerable scholarly attention, the 
“central role of water politics, water culture, and water engineering” in shaping the 
Iberian society has remained largely unexplored. Differently than the general opinion, 
water control is at the heart of its management and should be conceived as a process of 
politically contested use of resources (Mollinga, 2008). In other words, the assessment of 
water management problems and the respective formulation of solutions are highly 
politicised issues.  
There is in effect a flagrant disconnection between the latest publicisation of 
water problems and the lack of politicisation, in the sense that questions related to water 
use and conservation are typically presented to the general public as the merely result of 
limited investments, inadequate technology or sheer public ignorance. The standard 
solutions to environmental degradation ignore fundamental questions about the 
beneficiaries of the exploitation of water systems or the unequal distribution of 
environmental impacts. The renovation of water management (informed by IWRM or 
suchlike principles) has been dominated by an emphasis on the so-called ‘new 
institutionalism paradigm’ that pays insufficient attention to local human agency and 
persistently excludes issues of power from the decisions about how to conduct the 
                                                 
7 Water management comprises multilayered measures carried out by public and private 
organisations in order to assess, allocate, use and preserve water stocks, aquatic processes and 
catchment systems. Water regulation includes the set of guidelines, legal instruments and 
economic incentives used by public organisations to influence social institutions. 
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reforms (Mollinga, 2001). Mainstream approaches, including scientific methodologies 
and advertisement campaigns, persistently neglect the complex and intricate processes of 
local identity and social struggles, expressed through nuanced mechanisms of power 
mediation (cf. Donahue and Johnston, 1998). In that sense, water remains ‘naturalised’ 
(i.e. water problems seem to pertain to an external world, a reality that is not close to 
people’s life) and ‘neutralised’ (i.e. water problems seem to be unintentional mistakes 
caused by the lack of technology or legislation).  
The biased formulation of the new approaches to water management has been 
denounced by authors working in the area of political ecology, who criticise the fact that 
environmental policies remain largely ‘apolitical’ and maintain only a narrow focus on 
economic gains and higher operational efficiency (Robbins, 2004). The key contribution 
of a political ecology approach is the scrutiny of the range of interests involved and the 
excavation of the “multiplicity of power relationships” associated to water (cf. 
Swyngedouw, 2004: 75). Political ecology emphasises that social asymmetries are 
responsible for uneven opportunities and constraints in the access to nature. Numerous 
studies have confirmed the fundamental connections between environmental degradation 
and broader issues of production, distribution and consumption of goods, and the 
circulation of capital. In its initial phase, in the 1970s and 1980s, political ecologists 
demonstrated the importance of global capitalism on the creation and multiplication of 
environmental disruption, making use of concepts like dependence theory and class 
struggle (Bryant, 2001) to explain problems occurring at different geographical scales. In 
the 1990s, the perceived excess on class issues, which seemed to subordinate the 
environmental concerns to structural economic rules, was contested by a new group of 
political ecologists that attempted to refocus the discipline “toward a politicised 
understanding of environmental explanation beyond the epistemology offered by the 
[solely] critique of capitalism” (Forsyth, 2003: 07). Under the influence of post-
structuralism, the new scholarly phase incorporated important developments in the areas 
of discourse analysis, feminist studies, state intervention and social construction of 
science.  
This apparent division within the political ecology arena between economic or 
cultural causes of environmental problems is, in effect, a false dichotomy that sometimes 
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threatens to split one of the most creative areas of contemporary thought about the 
environment. Watts and Pett (2004) argue that the post-structuralism contribution can be 
now taken for granted and the time is ripe for a ‘new’ moment of political ecology that 
combines critical theoretical engagements with the practical experience of new 
movements and civil society organisations. Political ecologists should all share the same 
interest in the twofold attack on nature and society by the symbolic and material 
mechanisms of late capitalism and, in particular, the expanding ‘neoliberalisation’ of 
nature (cf. Castree, 2008). In the water sector, nature neoliberalisation has resulted in the 
continuous homogenisation of policies and procedures, violent forms of reaction and 
multilevel disputes on the control of public policies, which by and large have constrained 
the achievement of an equitable and effective environmental conservation. Political 
ecology is well placed to critically study this negative influence of the neoliberalisation 
of nature in northern and southern countries. As observed by Smith (2007), nature under 
the influence of capitalism remains constantly ‘produced’, in the sense that it is exploited 
and plucked for productive consumption, which in turn alters the form of nature, as a 
global and systematic ambition. Through an endless process of production, nature 
becomes a double object of accumulation via a dual strategy of circulation of capital 
through nature and the circulation of nature through capital. In the case of the Douro, it 
will be detailed below that the ‘production of nature’ in the catchment is linked to 
successive historical phases that retransformed natural features, appropriated common 
resources and resulted in unequal social and spatial opportunities.  
 
3. Nature production in the Douro catchment 
 
Water management is incorporated in processes happening at different 
geographical dimensions – from local demands to national development strategies – 
however the primary scale for the understanding of water management should be the 
catchment context (Ioris et al., 2006). The catchment, or river basin, is a water circulation 
system that evolves according to previous circumstances and preceding events, without 
ever reaching equilibrium, but containing indefinite spatiotime possibilities of change. 
Instead of fixity in time or in space, the hydrological circulation is accompanied by an 
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endless movement of matter and organisms in tandem with evolving social demands, 
practices and discourses. Catchments are the product of multiple trajectories of both 
society and nature together (cf. Massey, 2005) in permanent interrelation and in constant 
in transformation (cf. Swyngedouw, 2004). Because of the social and natural interaction, 
catchment boundaries are constantly transgressed by, for example, the removal or 
accretion of water, species and people. The very decision to consider or leave out some 
catchment processes is essentially political and “drawing [watershed] boundaries is a 
supremely political act” (Blomquist and Schlager, 2005). The catchment is, therefore, 
more than just a landscape carved by the flow of water from higher points to the mouth, 
but constitutes “arenas where both water and power circulate” (Molle, 2007). 
The multifarious mechanisms of water use and water development in the Douro 
catchment embodied this dynamic transformation of nature and society. The 
interrelations between society and nature in the Douro have historically had water as both 
a ‘locus’ of change and as a medium for the externalisation of social and environmental 
transformations. The contemporary geography of the catchment is the direct consequence 
of a long process of socionatural change that reflects the very construction of Portugal as 
a nation. The city of Porto, in the mouth of the Douro, was a commercial centre already 
in medieval time and, since the 15th Century, an important port of the maritime trade 
maintained by the Portuguese. In the 17th Century (at least since 1651, cf. Cardoso, 
2003), wine export to England transformed Porto into the main export centre in the 
country. The expansion of wine production reflected periods of intense state intervention, 
followed by liberalisation and again direct government regulation of an industry 
increasingly dominated by foreign capital (Jacquinet, 2006). Wine was, and still is, 
produced in the upper catchment, close to the Spanish border, and then transported to the 
city of Porto where the headquarters of the trading companies were, and still are, located. 
The River Douro was not only the main means of transportation for the wine produced 
upstream (until early 20th Century brought downstream using little boats called ‘rabelo’), 
but it was also the main reference for political and economic organisation. The internal 
movement of commodities and capital in the catchment resulted in an uneven distribution 
of power between the upper reaches, the production zone, and the lower reaches, the 
commercial and political centre.  
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If wine production and fluvial navigation marked the use of water in the 18th and 
19th Centuries, heavy engineering became the main focus of government interventions in 
water management during the 20th Century. The nascent Portuguese Republic, after the 
crumbling of the monarchy in 1910, passed a new water law in 1919 that reorganised the 
hydraulic services according to the economic and political goals of the new regime 
(MAOT, 2002). In the next decades, water became increasingly entangled in sectoral and 
spatial disputes related to the creation of conditions for economic development and 
political legitimisation. Water supply to the city of Porto had been since 1882 under the 
control of a French operator but it was notoriously insufficient and inadequate. The 
municipal system of Porto was nationalised in 1927 by the dictatorship that emerged 
from the 1926 coup d’état. In 1934, the same municipal company was given the 
responsibility of supplying water to neighbouring urban settlements. Despite some 
localised improvements, in the following decades the water industry in the Douro 
remained notoriously inefficient and was blamed for recurrent shortcomings (Alves, 
2005). It was only in the 1990s, as part of the broader context of government reforms, 
that a new legislation (Decree 379/1993) was passed to rearrange the legal framework. 
The new legal regime allowed for greater participation of private companies in the 
provision of water services; the focus shifted from the exclusive responsibility on the 
municipal authorities in favour of an ‘entrepreneurial’ approaches and a semi-
privatisation of water supply and sanitation services (Correia, 2000).8 A regional water 
utility was formed in 1995 (Águas do Douro e Paiva) to attend not only Porto, but also 
the surrounding municipalities (water is bought from the regional utility and then 
provided to customers at subsidised rates by the municipal councils; one of the objectives 
of the new public policies is to remove this subsidy). The rest of the catchment is mainly 
served by small, localised water systems (more than 1,400 isolated schemes attend ¼ of 
the catchment population, cf. INAG, 2001). When compared with the rest of the country, 
the rate of water supply and sanitation in the Douro remains below the national average: 
                                                 
8 Part of the same reform process, a new national regulator was established (IRAR) in 1997 
specifically to regulate water supply and sanitation. Since then, there have been growing 
opportunities for the semi-privatisation of public utilities, something that Smith (2004) defines as 
water ‘corporatisation’, in that it involves changing public institutional structures to incorporate 
private sector principles in the provision of services, but making it increasingly less accountable 
to the public and even to politicians. 
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only 83% of the population is served by public water supply and 28% is attended by 
sewage services, against 92% and 42% of the nation as a whole (INAG, 2005).  
 Among the various sectors that use water, the expansion of hydropower is 
probably the one that better corresponded to the political aspirations of the ‘sister’ 
dictatorships that governed Portugal and Spain during great part of the 20th Century. 
Particularly after 1950, hydraulic engineering became part of the conservative process of 
economic development and industrialisation of Portugal, during which the Douro, due to 
the combination of abundant water and steep slopes, became the ‘powerhouse of the 
country’. Hydropower dams represented the most dramatic form of concentrated 
developmental intervention, although the dams contributed very little to improve the life 
conditions of the local populations beyond the short period of construction (Pascoal, 
2000). In 1975, the national electricity utility EDP was founded, resulting from the 
unification of 13 of the 14 existing companies. Those companies had been previously 
nationalised by the government in order to allow the formation of the large state utility 
(in the opposite direction, EDP began to be denationalised in 1997, even though in a 
typical Portuguese fashion the state still maintains strong influence over the privatised 
company). Especially due to public investments in the 1980s and 1990s, ten large 
schemes were built in the catchment, which correspond to a total generation capacity of 
1,770 MW (or 42.7% of the national total), in addition to 37 small schemes (< 10 MW) 
that respond for additional 173 MW (INAG, 2005). According to EDP plans, there is a 
remaining potential for an expansion of another 2,000 MW, but that would obviously 
take place in the less favourable and more controversial sites (in recent years, the 
proposals of new Dams in the Douro, such as in the rivers Coa and Sabor, have already 
attracted fierce criticism from NGOs and local residents).  
In more recent times, the relative abundance of freshwater and the unique features 
of the Douro are once again identified as a strategic asset of regional development. 
Investments in water management and hydraulic infrastructure became part of an ardent 
debate about the economic perspectives of the Northern part of Portugal (e.g. CCDR-N, 
2006). The fact that the northern region is increasingly relegated to the periphery of 
Portugal and Europe (Silva Peneda, Member of the European Parliament, pers. commun.) 
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inevitably creates renewed pressures on the river system.9 For example, the demand for 
renewable sources of energy – e.g. hydropower generation – brings the global reaction to 
climate change and global warming down to the Douro catchment. The reform of the 
public water services in the Douro catchment, in the form of privatisation or 
‘corporatisation’, constitutes an important element of the modernisation of the national 
state apparatus according to neoliberal goals.10 All that makes the Douro a privileged 
case study of water institutional reforms, due to its insertion into the global economy and 
the socionatural complexity of water uses in the catchment.  
To understand the full extent of the water demands and related management 
issues, we need a political economy approach to the environment that recognises 
economic processes and the governance of nature “embedded within, and mediated 
through, the specific practices and institutional frameworks” of regions and places 
(Bridge and Jonas, 2002). Despite hydropower and water supply, the economic activity 
that nowadays consumes the largest volume of water in the Douro is agriculture 
irrigation, which responds for 114,000 hectares of crop production (INAG, 2005). Most 
of the irrigation is localised in the lower part of the catchment, benefiting from the best 
agriculture soils and the proximity to the larger urban centres. The majority of the 
production employs modern techniques of water management, but a significant 
proportion of the area of irrigation (around 30,000 ha) still uses traditional gravity 
irrigation methods with low efficiency (INAG, 2001). In addition, fluvial navigation is 
again regaining importance as an economic activity, not only for the transport of goods 
but especially for tourism (172,683 passengers navigated along the 213 km of waterways 
in 2007, IPMT, 2008), which has the outstanding beauty of the catchment and its natural 
heritage as the main attractions mentioned by visitors and tourists (Ribeiro, 1998).  
Industrial production is another major water user sector and the discharge of 
effluents into the river system only aggravates the level of pollution caused by the lack of 
sewage treatment. Water quality is indeed seriously affected by household and industrial 
effluents, as well as by diffuse pollution from agriculture in Portugal and in Spain. Data 
                                                 
9 Portugal’s economy is in a ‘semi-peripheral and intermediary level of development’ (cf. Santos, 
1993, in Henriques, 2007), in which the state has historically been the main economic player. 
10 “Pre-reforms of the state waiting the ‘yes’ from the Treasury” [Pré-reformas no estado 
dependem do ‘sim’ das finanças], Diário Económico, 08 Apr 2008.  
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from the surveillance system (cf. http://snirh.pt) show no clear trend of water quality 
improvement in recent years (there is a recovery of Class A, the best water quality 
condition, but the decline in Classes B, C and D, and a sudden increase in Class E). The 
sources of water degradation in the Douro are not restricted to pollution but also include 
the negative influence of dams on native species, sediments and riparian habitats 
(Cristovão, 1999). Because of the dams in Spain, at the point of entry in Portugal, the 
river flow is reduced by 27% in an average year of 33% in a dry year. At the mouth of the 
river, the level of reduction is respectively 17% for an average year and 19% for a wet 
year, which indicates a recovery capacity in the Portuguese section of the river (INAG, 
2001). The water balance is further impacted by evaporation from the artificial reservoirs, 
representing a loss of water that is equivalent to 9% of the annual water demand in the 
catchment (INAG, 2001).  
 
4. Old institutions dressed up in new clothes: the ‘techno-bureaucratic shortcut’  
 
From the discussion so far, it should become clear that the circumstances of water 
use in the Douro are the result of complex processes of regional development, spatial 
transformation and nation building. Through the centuries, the use of water evolved from 
fluvial navigation and dispersed household demands into hydropower, mechanised 
irrigation and urban water supply. The more intense manipulation of water predictably 
resulted in growing negative impacts (e.g. lost river continuity, depleted flows and water 
pollution), which have unevenly affected different social groups and spatial areas in the 
catchment. There were some early calls for the reorganisation of water management 
institutions after the return to democracy in 1974 (Cunha, 1980), but the decisive turn-off 
was the entrance of Portugal into the European Union in 1986 (Queirós, 2002). After 
becoming a full EU member, structural changes and rapid economic growth (stimulated 
by foreign capitals) triggered the review of the then limited environmental regulation. 
The main piece of water legislation in this period was the 1994 law (Decree 45/1994) 
that, among other measures, determined the development of the Douro River Basin Plan 
(published in 2001) with an extensive programme of measures to be implemented 
through the following eight years. However, in practice, the execution of the Douro plan 
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failed to address water degradation and water management problems; for the most part it 
only contributed to the consolidation of previously scattered information about the 
catchment (Pimenta Machado, CCDR-N officer, pers. commun.). The implementation of 
the 1994 legislation was nationwide problematic due to the weaknesses of the public 
agencies, together with the dismantling of the river basin organisations that, although 
very precarious, existed before (Correia, 2000).  
It was only with the approval of WFD in 2000, under the Portuguese presidency 
of the European Union, that the prospect of more substantial changes seemed to 
materialise. The Directive was translated into national Portuguese legislation in 2005 
(Law 58/2005) and, since then, most local stakeholders passed to identify the opportunity 
to finally resolve pending and challenging water management problems. WFD introduced 
significant institutional innovations in Europe, such as integrated river basin 
management, amalgamation of pollution control strategies, water quantity regulation, 
water pricing and full cost recovery, and wider public involvement. On the other hand, 
the implementation of the new regulatory regime has not been without problems. Because 
of its complexity, normative and informational uncertainties have permeated the reform 
of the regulatory institutions, but these uncertainties have not been sufficiently and 
systematically addressed (Newig et al., 2005). Equally, although WFD’s approval has 
been fraught with lobbying and sectoral disputes (Page and Kaika, 2003), the 
configuration of the new Directive conveys a particular style of assessing problems and 
formulating solutions that is still notably in favour of top-down measures and 
apoliticisation (see the critical assessment of Hedelin, 2008). That broader context of 
political denial and uneven decision-power that underpins the WFD regime has been 
replicated in the national experience of Portugal, where the engagement with the public 
has been especially controlled and limited to public hearings and public comments. It has 
been observed that the decision-making on water policies in Portugal had repeatedly 
bypassed the formal channels of public representation to operate behind closed doors and 
away from public scrutiny (Veiga, 2007). In the case of the EIA Directive, for example, 
participation was simply adopted to conform to the European legal requisites, as can be 
seen from the flawed design and biased methods of participation then used (Videira et al., 
2006). More recently and in relation to WFD, a round of discussions about its 
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implementation attracted an audience composed of mainly civil servants (60%), of 
delegates from electricity and water supply utilities (8%), and of private consultants 
(32%), leaving out the general public, in particular those affected by the water 
management decisions (cf. INAG, 2007).  
Based on the data we gathered in the Douro in 2008, we hypothesise that the 
implementation of WFD in the catchment has been characterised by two fundamental 
milestones, namely an increase in the application of science (i.e. the reliance on scientific 
tools and methodologies for the assessment of problems and formulation of management 
decisions) and the concentration on the economic dimension of water (i.e. the use and 
management of water remain subordinate to economic priorities). The crucial problems is 
that the emphasis on an ever more accurate ‘scientific explanation’ (as if a perfect 
management could be achieved with more environmental data and better capacity of data 
processing), coupled with the insistence that water is a repository of ‘financial value’ 
(and, because of that, environmental conservation should follow the same market 
rationality that gears regional development), have greatly restricted the contribution of 
the WFD regulation to resolve old and new problems. The limited space where WFD 
operates in Portugal only allows superficial adjustments in long-established water 
management procedures, without ever questioning the existence of unequal benefits and 
uneven liabilities. The attempt to achieve WFD goals without addressing the socionatural 
complexity of the catchment can be described as a ‘techno-bureaucratic’ shortcut. The 
essence of the ‘shortcut’ is to employ fragmented, non-critical applications of science and 
economics to old problems that have at least three centuries of history while it ignores the 
context of water use that was responsible for environmental degradation in the first place.  
The first vector of the ‘techno-bureaucratic shortcut’ – the endless search for the 
scientific understanding of water systems and the development of patchy managerial 
approaches – has occupied great part of the agenda of the Portuguese public agencies (in 
particular, the Institute of Water, INAG), academics and non-governmental 
organisations.11 Most of WFD implementation is dedicated to the development of 
                                                 
11 The technocratic basis of the ‘new integrative paradigm’ in Europe becomes clear from the 
funding of research to support the introduction of the new approaches (e.g. during the Fifth 
Framework Programme, 1998-2002, 30 million euros were spent to fund IWRM related projects, 
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technical methodologies that try to interpret what ‘good ecological status’ (the ultimate 
goal of the WFD regulation) effectively means. Behind public policies and documents, 
‘good ecological status’ is defined as a return to a pristine environment with restored 
ecological and chemical conditions. The historical and cultural aspects of water use are 
unceremoniously dropped in favour of simplistic determination of physico-chemical 
parameters (which are assessed against standardised thresholds, mostly imported from 
northern Europe). It assumes that, once the impact is quantified, the mechanical 
application of science and technology (a technical ‘quick fix’) should be enough to 
remove the source of impact and re-establish a ‘good ecological status’. This extremely 
linear understanding of the interaction between nature and society follows a 
unidirectional mental equation that can be represented as: 
 
‘quantify degradation + technical fix = impact mitigation (i.e. return to a pristine condition)’ 
 
According to this formulation, a ‘pristine environment’ is equated to a system without 
human ‘interference’, as if all social and economic activities had necessarily the same 
tendency to cause environmental degradation. Such reasoning denies the fact that humans 
and the environment co-evolved through millennia to form those ecosystems that are now 
considered to be in ‘good ecological condition’ (such as in the upper Douro river). By the 
same token, it ignores the fact that most of the Douro degradation happened because of 
the intensification of electricity, industry and irrigation promoted in the second half of the 
20th Century and to fulfil specific economic goals. In other words, the underlying 
reasoning is one that abstractly equates human interference with environmental 
disruption, without sufficiently taking into account the historico-geographic 
circumstances of local problems and potential management responses.    
Environmental regulation obviously needs straightforward approaches to deal 
with complex systems; moreover, the ‘black box’ application of science has 
fundamentally served as a legitimisation tool for the implementation of WFD in Portugal. 
The mainstream rationality relies on scientific expertise as source of ‘truth’ that cannot be 
                                                                                                                                                 
but most of the effort was placed on model development and involved little interaction with 
stakeholders, cf. Pahl-Wostl, 2007). 
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questioned, but serves to identify problems and formulate management solutions. In 
effect, the acceptance of the WFD regulation has been facilitated because of the high 
level of environmental risks identified in recently commissioned assessments. It is very 
revealing that the first WFD assessments allocated to the Douro the highest percentage of 
surface water bodies under substantial environmental pressures (80.5% of the total: 513 
out of 638 water bodies) among all the Portuguese river basins (cf. INAG, 2005). It 
means that even a river with relative abundance of water and a catchment with relatively 
preserved areas cannot escape the highly technical verdict of WFD. Despite that bleak 
picture that legitimises the new regulatory approaches with severe assessments, most 
environmental pressures will be legally allowed to carry on: that can happen under the 
mechanisms of derogation. Invoking Article 4.7 of the Directive, it is legally possible to 
grant less stringent environmental objectives to water licence holders on grounds of 
disproportionate costs or technical unfeasibility. This twisted application of science, on 
the one hand very rigorous (i.e. alarming technical assessments), on the other, very 
lenient (i.e. making use of derogations), only reveals the highly politicised and 
unbalanced basis of the whole WFD regime. 
The politicised nature of the assessment of environmental impacts is directly 
related to the second vector of the ‘techno-bureaucratic shortcut’, namely the strong 
reliance on economic instruments of water policy in Portugal. The application of 
economic goals to water management has occupied the Portuguese water policies for 
more than a decade, in particular since the ‘polluter-pays principle’ was incorporated in 
the 1987 Framework Law on the Environment (Law 10/1987). Water degradation was 
conceptualised by environmental economists as a form of ‘resource scarcity’, which 
creates the material and political conditions for treating water as an economic factor of 
production. More explicit provisions for cost recovery, revenue raising and efficiency 
incentives were introduced in the aforementioned 1994 legislation and later confirmed by 
the 2004 national water plan (INAG, 2004). However, during the pre-WFD period, 
administrative difficulties and the resistance of some water users prevented the 
operationalization of the polluter-pays principle. It was only with the translation of the 
WFD into national law that the adoption of a more explicit economic rationality became 
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possible, for the reason that the Directive “promotes the concept of water as an economic 
commodity and the use of economic principles to guide decisions” (Morris, 2007).  
During the time of our fieldwork, the final details of the bulk water charges were 
being discussed to be in place by June 2008 (the charges had been already approved by 
the Council of Ministers on Mar 2008). The government estimated that the annual 
revenue will be between €40 and 50 million to be used in water management and 
environmental restoration.12 Interestingly, the larger water users – hydropower and public 
supply in particular – raised little opposition against the introduction of bulk water 
charges during the negotiation that took place in 2007. As expected, the only sector with 
major reservations about bulk water charges was agriculture (Fernanda Gomes, planning 
coordinator, INAG), which is also struggling to cope with the reform of the EU Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP) and pressures from the international markets. The hydropower 
and water supply companies contacted during our research seem to believe that, despite 
the new financial burden, the new institutional framework operates in their favour, given 
that it introduces a stable regime of water commodification, legitimatised economic 
transactions around water and, more importantly, a decision-making system that is 
amenable to the interests of large operators. Providers of public services of water and 
electricity can likewise transfer the financial burden to their customers without having to 
mobilise their own resources. 
Maybe because Portugal is a latecomer in the implementation of the polluter-pays 
principle (when compared with for example Spain, France or England), most of the 
environmental regulators contacted during our research also demonstrated remarkable 
enthusiasm for the imminent implementation of bulk water charges. It was possible to 
perceive a genuine expectation about the advantages of adopting the so-called economic 
instruments of water management (e.g. charges and financial incentives). Nonetheless, it 
is still to be proved that the best intentions of regulators and environmental economists in 
terms of improving water husbandry can be demonstrated in practice. For instance, 
Martins and Fortunato (2007) studied water supply tariffs in Portugal and identified weak 
                                                 
12 Cf. “Taxa de Recursos Hídricos entra em vigor em Junho” [Bulk water charges will start in 
June 2008], Ambiente OnLine (www.ambienteonline.pt/noticias/), 07 Mar 2008. The amount to 
be obtained from water charges represents around 10% of the annual demand for investment 
between 2001-2020, as described in the 2004 National Water Plan.  
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price elasticity (i.e. little response to higher charges). Given the current level of charges, 
it is unlikely that the it can provide enough incentives to change consumer behaviour (in 
the Douro, it is calculated that the transference of bulk water charges for domestic 
consumers will represent an increase of only 5% in the current bill of average 
households, or additional € 0.0156/m3 cf. Joana Boaventura, Águas do Douro e Paiva, 
pers. commun.). If it is true that the polluter-pays principle can help to identify 
responsibilities for environmental damage (Liodakis, 2000), the claim that an optimal 
economic solution would naturally follow from the adoption of water charges (cf. Chong 
and Sunding, 2006) only exposes the technocratic basis of the WFD regime. The narrow 
scientific and economic pillars of the WFD regime directly reflect a combination of 
hegemonic rationality and commodity fetishism, a recipe that in other countries has 
generated multiple social inequalities (cf. Loftus, 2006).  
The ‘techno-bureaucratic’ shortcut that shapes water reforms in Portugal is also 
increasingly present on the other side of the Douro catchment, beyond the Spanish 
border. Technical assessments identified 98,000 hectares of irrigated land suffering from 
water deficit in Spain (out of the 550,000 hectares under irrigation in the Spanish section 
of the Douro), which nonetheless was not enough to prevent the preparation of a plan to 
increase the area of production by another 306,475 hectares and the related expansion of 
water infrastructure (Confederación Hidrográfica del Duero, 1994). Bakker (2002) had 
observed that droughts in Spain in the mid-1990s facilitated discursive depictions of 
water as increasingly scarce, which served as additional justification for the long-held 
vision of large-scale resource development and interbasin transfer projects. The constant 
attempt to find quick fix solutions – the essence of the techno-bureaucratic shortcut – was 
particularly evident in the plans to transfer water from the Tejo to the Douro that emerged 
in Spain in the 1990s. Similar ideas were put forward during the 2008 drought in the form 
of a proposal to transfer water from the Ebro to the city of Barcelona, which means that 
in the future that Douro can be again remembered as a reserve of water to other regions. 
The techno-bureaucratic intensification of water use on the two sides of the border cannot 
avoid the crude conclusion that “it is not clear that the Douro can bear the ambitious 
water management plans of both countries” (Dominguez et al. 2004). 
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5. Discussion and conclusions: The past encroaches upon the future 
 
This brief overview of the local experience of water institutional reforms in the 
Douro demonstrates the inherent contradiction between the formal objectives of recent 
water policies and the procedures actually adopted on the ground. The process of 
institutional reforms started in the 1990s with changes in the legislation and increasing 
calls for an integrated management, but it was really the opportunity created by WFD that 
provided the political momentum for more ambitious reforms. The narrow focus on 
engineering constructions that marked water management between 1950s-1990s was then 
replaced by more subtle attempts to regulate water through ecological assessment and 
economic instruments. Although there was a shift from single procedures to multilevel 
integrated approaches (e.g. INAG, 2001; 2005), it is also possible to detect a clear line of 
continuity between past and present. If the WFD regime helps to draw attention to water 
problems and mobilises private and public resources, at the same time it unravels silent 
conflicts, creates competition (e.g. sites for hydropower) and domesticates public 
participation. Water management continues to be a highly politicised matter, but that is 
largely omitted in most public documents and academic assessments. Underneath the new 
regulatory instruments, there is a constant reaffirmation of a centralised and selective 
basis of dealing with water management questions. A rationalistic approach to water 
problems – epitomised here in the expression ‘techno-bureaucratic shortcut’ – has 
pervaded most of the ongoing reforms. Using the terminology of critical realism, it can be 
concluded that the relation between the WFD regime and the techno-bureaucratic 
rationality is not only contingent, but necessary. 
The overall result has been a considerable self-cancellation of the ambitious goals 
of WFD in the Douro, due to the narrow understanding of water problems and potential 
solutions. That is consistent with the findings of Hedelin (2008) that the Directive has 
facilitated integration and raised public participation, but has also failed to handle power 
asymmetries, foster collective learning and avoid that different ideological orientations 
are suppressed. Similar assessments of the initial stages of WFD implementation, in 
another European country, show that policy learning through participation appears 
significantly limited due to the pattern of interest group power (Flynn and Kröger, 2003). 
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It seems that the socionatural complexity of catchment dynamics is still systematically 
neglected in favour of top-down, prearranged management responses. There has been 
indeed scarce room for alternative ways of thinking about water management problems, 
let alone the formulating solutions that are less intensive in capital and less dependent on 
imported technologies. So far, the renovation of social institutions has only dealt with the 
consequences, but not the causes of socionatural problems, namely the subordination of 
social and environmental demands to the economic and political priorities of an 
increasing neoliberalisation of nature. The discourse of official publications and the mass 
media conceals who is telling the storylines of the Douro, what the involved interests are 
and how political asymmetries have influenced the decisions. For all those reasons, what 
is really required is a decisive break with traditional mechanisms of water control, not its 
generalisation. What is needed is a genuinely innovative way of dealing with water 
problems, one that addresses the uneven balance of power between spatial areas and 
social groups, as well as incorporates traditional wisdom and the contribution of local 
communities in the development of creative solutions to old and new water management 
challenges. Unless social differences and the reproduction of social inequalities are 
addressed, the causes of water management problems will remain unchanged.  
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